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This paper analyzes return migration and asset accumulation in a stochastic dynamic model
using a longitudinal dataset on legal immigrants in Germany. Our model gives a number of
implications about the level, timing and selection of return migration along with the savings
pro￿les of immigrants. In addition, we examine how the return and savings behavior of
immigrants vary according to their country of origin and demographic characteristics. The
model is used to determine the impact of a number of counterfactual policy experiments on
the composition of immigrants, such as changes in the unemployment insurance program and
the payment of bonuses conditional on their employment status and duration of residence to
encourage immigrants to return home. In addition, we assess the impact of counterfactuals
in the macroeconomic environment, like changes in wages in Germany and in purchasing
power parity between Germany and the source countries.
List of Themes: Migration, Labor Market Policy
Keywords: International Migration, Unemployment Insurance, Life Cycle Models and
Saving, Public Policy
JEL Codes: J61, D91, J64, J65, J681 INTRODUCTION
Many European countries see immigration as a potential solution to the social security crisis
they face due to an aging native population, rising health costs and low fertility rates.1
Immigration brings in younger workers who often pay into the social security system for
many years and then return home before collecting bene￿ts.2 However, immigrants can
become a ￿nancial burden on the host country if they come at or stay until older ages
when they draw from public health and social insurance systems more than they contribute
to them. Higher fertility rates among immigrants may help slow down the aging of the
host country population, but they may also bring about higher education and welfare costs.
Whether immigrants become a burden also depends in part on whether they are selective
of more or less able workers in their home country, whether the stayers are selective of the
most or least economically successful immigrants, as well as on the economic assimilation of
the stayers.
The return behavior of immigrants has important economic implications for the source
country as well. A major motivation for immigration is asset accumulation. Although
an exodus of workers seeking to take advantage of higher wages in other countries may
impose a cost on the source country economy, migrants who return home often bring with
them signi￿cant amounts of assets. Moreover, many of them invest their assets in small
businesses.3 Another major contribution of immigrants to the source country economy is
their remittances.4 Since the amount of assets immigrants can accumulate depends on their
1Boerch-Supan and Schnabel (1999) report the following for the German social security system: ￿In 1993,
social security bene￿ts amounted to 10.3 percent of GDP, a share more than two and a half times larger
than in the United States.￿
2According to Bohning (1981), in the Federal Republic of Germany, 9 in 10 Italian, 8 in 10 Spanish, 7
in 10 Greek, 5 in 10 Yugoslav, and 3 in 10 Turkish workers admitted to work during the years 1961-76 left
during this period.
3Based on a survey of Turkish emigrants from Germany in Turkey, Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2002)
report that only 6 percent worked as salaried workers after return, whereas 51 percent of the returners
operated small businesses. The other 43 percent were retired. Another interesting fact that Dustmann and
Kirchkamp report is that the median age of the retirees among the returners was 45. This suggests that
some immigrants were able to accumulate enough assets by a relatively early age to spend the rest of their
lifes as rentiers. The facts that half of these migrants engaged in entrepreneurial activities after return and
that most of the rest lived as rentiers suggest that the major motivation for their immigration was asset
accumulation.
4Immigrants￿ remittances are a huge support factor for the balance of payments of some source countires.
1economic performance in the host country, immigrants￿ economic success in the host country
is also important for the source country.
In order to in￿uence the number and demographic composition of immigrants, some host
countries adopted policies to motivate immigrants to return to their home country. For
instance, in 1983 Germany implemented a policy that provided ￿nancial aid to immigrants
conditional on returning, especially oriented towards certain nationalities and the unem-
ployed.5 At the same time, Germany adopted other seemingly countervailing policy changes
aimed at increasing the social assimilation of immigrants. Recently, the German govern-
ment has implemented changes in the citizenship laws that make it easier for the children of
immigrants to acquire German citizenship. In this paper, we analyze the impact of various
￿nancial aid schemes as well as the impact of the policies designed to increase the social
integration of immigrants on return migration ￿ows and on the demographic composition
and labor market outcomes of the stayers.
An important policy issue in many host countries is immigrants￿ take-up of welfare ben-
e￿ts. Many host countries are taking steps in the direction of restricting bene￿ts to im-
migrants.6 One reason for higher welfare participation among immigrants in Germany is
their higher unemployment rate compared to that of the natives. In December 1999, the
unemployment rate was 23.3% for Turks and 18.4% for Italians. Therefore, a question of
interest to policy makers is how changes in the unemployment compensation system aect
immigrants￿ return decisions.
This paper develops and estimates a dynamic model of joint return migration and savings
decisions under uncertainty. In the model, migrants are subject to earnings, employment
and assimilation shocks and they make decisions about what fraction of their income to save
and about whether and when to return to their home country. The structural framework of
the model allows us to analyze the impact a number of counterfactual policy experiments
on both savings and return migration decisions. In addition, since we model the migrants￿
decisions in a dynamic setting, we are able to explore the eects of these policies not only on
migrants￿ return decision but also on their duration of residence. The model also incorporates
For instance, for India, the top receiver country, remittances are equal to 2.6% of its GDP. For Mexico and
Turkey, these ￿gures are 1.7% and 2.3%, respectively (IMF, 1999).
5Dustmann (1996) reports that the return aid amounted to 10,500 DM for each worker. In addition, there
was a 1,500 DM bonus for each child. (Roughly, 2 DM is equal to 1 US $.)
6For instance, in the U.S., a law passed in 1996 denied immigrants most types of welfare bene￿ts. In
Germany, immigrants without permanent residence may lose their right to stay if they live on welfare bene￿ts.
2unobserved heterogeneity in migrants￿ permanent skill endowments and location speci￿c
preferences.
In our model, the reasons that migrants return to their home country are lower prices
in the home country, location-speci￿c preferences, and unexpected events such as shocks to
earnings and preferences. We exploit the variation in the price levels across source countries
to identify the eects of purchasing power on migrants￿ decisions and investigate how changes
in the purchasing power parity, which could happen as a result of a devaluation in the source
country or as a result of the exchange rate policies of the source country governments,
in￿uence migrants￿ savings and return decisions. Our model also incorporates variation
in the earnings potential across the source countries. This would be especially important
in the return decision of younger immigrants. We assess the response of immigrants to
changes in the wage dierential between the source country and Germany. A number of
policies that the German government could implement would change the wage dierential.
For instance, implementation of anti-discrimination or economic integration policies would
increase migrants￿ earnings in Germany. On the other hand, foreign investment in the source
countries or trade agreements with them would increase migrants￿ potential earnings back
at home. We compare the response of migrants to an increase in their earnings in Germany
to their response to an increase in their potential earnings in their home country.
The model is estimated using a unique longitudinal dataset from Germany that contains
information on guestworkers who immigrated to Germany in the 1960￿s and 70￿s under
bilateral agreements signed by the German government with ￿ve Mediterranean countries;
three of which now belong to the European Union (Greece, Italy and Spain) and two that
do not (Turkey and ex-Yugoslavia).
The data reveal several interesting patterns concerning return migration ￿ows and savings
behavior. Immigrants from wealthier countries (EU countries) are more likely to return.
The Kaplan-Meier hazard function estimated on non-EU migrants displays a hump shape,
reaching its peak at around 16 years of residence, whereas the hazard rates for EU migrants
are the highest within the ￿rst 6 years, then level o until around 20 years of residence, after
which they slightly increase again. Despite having similar income levels, non-EU migrants
save more compared to EU migrants during 10 to 20 years of residence. After 20 years of
residence, there is a signi￿cant drop in the level of the annual savings of non-EU migrants
while EU migrants maintain their previous level of annual savings. In other words, most of
non-EU returners return within the ￿rst 25 years and the savings pro￿le of non-EU stayers
3display a signi￿cant downward trend during this time; whereas the fraction of late returners
is higher among EU returners and the savings pro￿le for EU stayers is much ￿atter. In
addition, migrants who enter at older ages are more likely to return regardless of EU status.
However, the dierence is more pronounced for non-EU migrants. Non-EU migrants that
enter at older ages also save a higher fraction of their income compared to cohorts that
enter at younger ages, whereas there is no signi￿cant dierence in the savings behavior of
EU migrants by their age of entry. With regard to selection, the data indicate that return
migrants have lower earnings and are more likely to be unemployed compared to migrants
who stay.
We estimated the parameters of our model using simulated maximum likelihood estima-
tion. The results indicate that our model can account for the above facts. We ￿nd that a
signi￿cant fraction of immigrants who contribute to the social security system leave before
they draw any bene￿ts. This fraction is as high as one third for EU immigrants. We also ￿nd
that immigrants who return hold signi￿cantly more assets than those who stay in Germany.
The average amount of assets that returners take with them when they return to their home
country is estimated to range from 115,000DM for Italian immigrants to 193,000DM for
Yugoslavian immigrants.
In addition, we used the estimated parameters to assess the impact of a number of pol-
icy experiments on savings and return migration decisions. We ￿nd that decreasing the
replacement rate of the unemployment compensation system is not eective in increasing
the return rates of immigrants. Nor is it successful in selecting out the unemployed among
those who change their return decision as a result of the policy. On the other hand, targeting
the unemployed with ￿nancial bonuses conditional on return is more successful in selecting
out the unemployed in encouraging return. Financial bonuses conditional on return before
immigrants qualify for pension bene￿ts are successful in achieving the intended goal of in-
creasing the return rate of immigrants that return before qualifying. However, many of the
extra-returners as a result of the policy are those who would leave anyway in the succeed-
ing years and the policy makes little impact in increasing the cumulative hazard rates after
longer periods.
We also ￿nd that an increase in German wages, in fact, decreases the survival rate among
non-EU immigrants between 10 and 20 years. This is a result of the hump of hazard function
becoming even more pronounced because immigrants can save at a faster pace. However,
the survivor rate after 20 years of residence for non-EU immigrants and survival rates at
4all duration of residences for EU immigrants increase because the substitution eect -the
dierence between German wages and home country wages increase- dominates the income
eect from higher wealth at each period. An increase in wages in Germany noticeably
increases the savings of non-EU immigrants and makes their savings pro￿le steeper; whereas,
the impact on the savings behavior of EU immigrants is much smaller.
Our simulations also indicate that an increase in the purchasing power parity between
Germany and the source countries brings about a remarkable increase in the hazard rates
and savings of all immigrant groups. However, immigrants from EU countries are more
responsive to the proportional changes in the purchasing power parity. There are stronger
decreasing returns in the decrease of the survival rate for EU countries, though.
In the next section, we give background information and review part of the relevant lit-
erature. In section 3, we present the model and its solution. Section 4 describes the data
and section 5 presents some descriptive analysis. Section 6 covers the estimation method
and section 7 has our estimation results. The results of policy experiments and the counter-
factuals on the macroeconomic environment are presented in sections 8 and 9, respectively.
Section 10 concludes.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELEVANT LITERATURE
The literature has identi￿ed a number of determinants of return migration. Borjas and Brats-
berg (1996) emphasize that return migration may be part of an optimal life-cycle location
decision. At the time they immigrate, migrants realize that after they acquire physical or
human capital in the host country, it may be optimal for them to return because the returns
to that type of capital are higher in the home country. If the home country has lower prices,
the assets that migrants accumulate in the source country will have higher purchasing power
at home. Another reason for return migration, noted by Hill (1987), is that migrants have a
preference for location. Return migration may also be the result of unexpected events, either
in the host country or in the home country (Berninghaus and Siefer-Vogt, 1992). Unexpected
changes in earnings or in preferences for living in Germany, for instance due to the death of
family members back at home, might alter migrants￿ decisions.
This study analyzes the behavior of the guestworkers of 1960￿s and 70￿s who immigrated to
Germany under the bilateral agreements signed by the German government with 5 Mediter-
ranean countries. (3 European Union countries: Greece, Italy and Spain; and 2 non-EU
5countries: Turkey and ex-Yugoslavia). The initial goal of the guestworker recruitment sys-
tem was to have these migrants work in Germany for a limited number of years and replace
them with new ones once their permit expired. While most of the migrants in fact went back,
some stayed. Paine (1974) reports that, in practice, if these guestworkers maintained their
employment status in Germany for a few years, they were able to stay. In 1973, after the oil
price shocks, recruitment of new immigrant workers came to a halt. However, immigration
continued mostly in the form of family reuni￿cation. 7
The German government actively recruited immigrant workers by opening recruitment
posts in the capitals and major cities of these countries. Residents of these countries who
were willing to go to Germany registered at these agencies and were matched with employers
in Germany. There was a high demand in these countries for immigration to Germany, which
meant that German agencies could be selective. According to Martin (1980) ￿With 10 Turks
wanting to work in Germany for each one recruited by employers, the Germans could be
selective, and they were. Some 30 to 40 percent of the Turks recruited to work in Germany
were skilled workers in Turkey who worked as manual laborers in Germany. By 1970, for
example, 40 percent of Turkey￿s carpenters and stonemasons were employed in Germany,
often as assembly line or unskilled workers.￿ Paine (1974) reports a similar experience for
Yugoslavia in that most of the urban migrants belonged to the skilled elite rather than the
unemployed. Therefore, there was positive selection in the immigration of guestworkers from
non-EU countries.
Immigrants constitute a relatively signi￿cant part of the German work force. The Federal
Ministry of the Interior reports that ￿1.95m foreigners had a job that made them liable to
pay social security contributions in the western federal territory, meaning they account for
8.9 per cent of all gainfully employed persons.￿ Return migration of these immigrants has
remained at a signi￿cant level. Between 1993 and 1998, around 45,000 Turks returned to
Turkey each year on average (Federal Ministry of the Interior). Given that there are around
2 million Turkish immigrants in Germany, this amounts to a 2% annual hazard rate.
As Martin reports, most of these guestworkers took jobs as unskilled workers. Therefore,
it is quite unlikely that their goal in moving to Germany was to acquire human capital.
Even if they acquired some skills, these skills would be speci￿c to the German labor market,
which is a more capital-intensive production environment, and would not ￿t to the needs of
the home country labor market. In addition, based on a survey of Turkish emigrants from
7Only 10% of the migrants in our sample entered Germany after 1973.
6Germany in Turkey, Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2002) report that only 6 percent worked
as salaried workers after return whereas 51 percent of the returners were self-employed.
The other 43 percent were retired. Another interesting fact that Dustmann and Kirchkamp
report is that the median age of the retirees among the returners was 45. This suggests
that some immigrants were able to accumulate enough assets by a relatively early age to
spend the rest of their lives as rentiers. The facts that half of these migrants engaged in
entrepreneurial activities after return and that most of the rest lived as rentiers suggest a
savings motive for immigrating to Germany. If the goal of guestworkers was to accumulate
assets, we would expect their savings rates to be high. Based on a empirical investigation of
Turkish households in Germany, Kumcu (1989), in fact, ￿nds evidence for very high savings
rates.
There is scant empirical evidence concerning the relationship between savings and return
migration. Galor and Stark (1990) argue that since migrants who return spend the second
part of their life in an environment where the wages and prices are lower, they would save
more compared to natives and to migrants who do not plan to go back. The existing empirical
research papers on the savings behavior of immigrants - Merkle and Zimmermann (1992),
Kumcu (1989) - treat return migration as exogenous. However, Dustmann (1995) shows
that treating return decision as exogenous in analyzing the savings behavior of migrants
could give false implications in policy experiments. The research on the joint return and
savings decisions of immigrants has been theoretical so far. Berninghaus and Seifert-Vogt
(1992) provide a theoretical analysis of optimal savings and return migration strategies in a
stochastic dynamic model where the cause of return is higher purchasing power parity. Our
paper builds on their model by also allowing for location-speci￿c preferences, employment
after return and unobserved heterogeneity; and carries out the ￿rst empirical investigation
of the joint return migration and savings decisions of immigrants. In addition, we provide
the ￿rst estimates of the response of immigrants to counterfactual policy experiments like
changes in the unemployment compensation system.
3 THE MODEL
In this section we present the basic structure of the model and its solution in the dynamic
setting. We model the decisions of male household heads. These male household heads are
allowed to dier in their permanent unobserved characteristics, in particular with respect to
7their preferences for living in Germany and their labor ability.
3.1 Basic Structure
3.1.1 Choice Set
The elements of the choice set are return migration and savings decisions. Each period,
immigrants ￿rst decide whether to stay in Germany or go back to their home country. If
they choose to stay, they also make a decision about how much to save.
3.1.2 Preferences in Germany
Migrants have preferences over consumption (ct) and location of residence. Their marginal
utility of consumption (￿) varies by age as well as by labor market status (lt). We also allow
the marginal utility of consumption to vary by nationality (z) as a function of the average
number of children for that nationality. 4(.) stands for immigrants￿ psychic cost of living in
Germany. This is the dierence between the psychic utility in Germany and that in the host
country. Immigrants￿ pyschic cost depends on their duration of residence in Germany as they
adjust to the new surroundings and on their permanent characteristics in their preferences
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b is the constant relative risk aversion parameter and #s
t is a shock to location-speci￿c
preferences.
Constraints Given their earnings (yt) and assets (At), migrants make their consumption
and savings decisions.
yt + (1 + r)At  ct + At+1
ct  cmin
At  0
Above, r is the ￿xed market rate of interest and cmin is the minimum consumption level,
which is equal to the subsistence income set by the German government.8 Borrowing is not
8This is explained in detail in the social assistance section below. A savings choice is feasible as long as
the consumption level it implies does not fall below this level.
8allowed.9
3.1.3 Labor Market Status in Germany
Transitions in the labor market are modeled as stochastic exogenous functions. Before age
60, there are only two states: employed (l = 1) and unemployed (l = 0). This is determined
by a logit regression. After age 60, migrants may enter retirement (l = 2), which is an
absorbing state. Therefore, employment status is determined by a multinomial logit. Labor
market status at each period is assumed to depend on the labor market status in the previous
period, age, age at entry to Germany as well as nationality.
lt = L(lt31,aget,age0,z)
3.1.4 Income in Germany
Earnings when Employed: Earnings of a migrant, yt, depend on how much human
capital he has acquired and on the rental price of human capital. The level of human capital
at any period, Ht, depends on the years of residence and permanent skill characteristics of
the migrant.






t is an iid shock to productivity.
Unemployment Bene￿ts and Unemployment Assistance: Migrants who worked for
at least 360 days in the last 3 years can receive unemployment bene￿ts, which are equal
to 67% of their last net earnings if they have at least one child (60%, otherwise). The
entitlement duration varies from 180 to 960 days depending on the age and experience of the
worker. However, workers who are no longer eligible for unemployment bene￿ts can receive
unemployment assistance. This is equal to 57% of their last net earnings if they have at least
one child (53%, otherwise) and there is no limit to the duration of unemployment assistance
after the exhaustion of unemployment bene￿ts.
We assume that all unemployed migrants quali￿ed for unemployment bene￿ts at some
point in the past by working one year in a period of three years. Therefore, even if their
9Migrants are there to save.
9unemployment bene￿ts entitlement duration is over, they are eligible for unemployment
assistance. We average the replacement rate of unemployment bene￿ts and assistance as
60%. Therefore, we can write earnings conditional on employment status as follows.
yt = 0.6pHte
j2
y/2 if lt = 0
Social Assistance for Subsistence Income: Migrants can also receive social assistance
which is provided by the German government to families whose income is not high enough to
provide for their basic needs. Eligibility depends on net income and asset holdings. If the sum
of monthly net income and asset ￿ows of residents falls below the subsistence income level10,
the government makes up for the dierence. Subsistence income for a family depends on its
size and varies across states. In 1998, the payment for the head of the household averaged
around 520 DM across states. The spouse of the household head receives 80% of this amount
and there is an additional payment for each child, which we take as 50% of the standard
payment.11 In calculating the total subsistence income, we take the typical household head
as married and allow the number of his children (n) depend on his nationality. Therefore,
yt + rAt >= 520  [1.8 + 0.5(no_child)z] DM per month
Retirement Bene￿ts: Migrants￿ social security contributions and, therefore, their retire-
ment bene￿ts depend on their earnings and duration of contribution. As a measure of their
earnings, we take their expected earnings at age 60 and adjust this by a fraction () that de-




y/2 if l = 2
10According to the German Ministry for Health and Social Services, this subsistence income includes
expenses on food, housing, clothing, toiletries, household goods, heating and everday personal necessities,
and -within resonable limits- expenses for socializing.
11In fact, the rate for children varies from 50% to 90% of the standard payment according to their age.
For tractibility, we take this 50%, which is the amount that corresponds to younger children.
12It would be a better approximation if we took average earnings rather than earnings at age 60 since the
latter does not account for the productivity shocks a migrant receives during his stay in Germany. However,
again for tractability we choose the former approach.
103.1.5 Preferences in the Home Country
Once a migrant returns to his home country, he exits the survey. As a result, we have no
information on his labor market status, earnings or savings decisions after return. Therefore,
we write the utility a migrant receives from returning to his home country to spend the rest
of his life there, V L( e St), as a function of the state variables at the time of return. This part
of migrants￿ preferences is deterministic.
3.2 EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATIONS
3.2.1 Risk Aversion Parameter
b = b0 + b1I(type2)
3.2.2 Marginal Utility of Consumption in Germany
￿t = ￿0 + ￿1aget + ￿2age
2
t + ￿3nzaget + ￿4nzage
2
t + ￿5I(lt = 1) + ￿6I(lt = 2)
where nz denotes the average number of children for nationality z.
3.2.3 Psychic Costs in Germany
4t = 40 + 41I(type2) +
3 X
i=1
41+iI(t = i) + [1 + 45I(type2)]  (46t + 47t
2)
Note that both the psychic costs at entry and the acclimatization rate are allowed to
change by permanent characteristics.
3.2.4 Bequest Function in Germany
Bt(.) = q0  (1  exp(q1  At))  q2I(type2)  (1 + q3nz)
113.2.5 Preferences for Living in the Home Country
V
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2
t,0}
where pppz is the purchasing power parity ratio between Germany and the source country
and ￿ wz is the expected wages in country z.
page = (76  aget)/2







is the sum of discount values for the remaining part of one￿s life.
{
1
age = I(aget  60){
1








is the discount factor for pension bene￿ts, which a migrant can start receiving only after age
60.
The following is an explanation of the terms in the above equation.
1st line: (Country Dummy): This is a discounted sum of per period country dummy
which is a measure of the general attractiveness of the source country. It would depend on
the source country characteristics like distance from Germany, whether or not the country
has a socialist regime, income inequality, amenities and so forth.13
13This dummy includes the transportation cost of return, which would vary by country of origin according
to its distance from Germany. We would not be able to separately identify the eect of monetary cost of
moving.
122nd line: (Utility from Assets): The utility from assets includes age interaction terms
because in his home country a migrant￿s per period consumption of the assets he acquired
in Germany would depend on the remaining length of his life. Level of assets is interacted
with purchasing power parity.
3rd line (Utility from German Pension Bene￿ts): In order to qualify for German pension
bene￿ts, one must have worked for at least 5 years (3 periods). Pension bene￿ts depend
on migrants￿ duration of residence. (Periods of unemployment are counted toward pension
bene￿t contribution. Since, in our model migrants are always in the labor market, duration
of time in the labor market is equal to duration of residence.) The purchasing power of the
German pension bene￿ts would depend on the country in which it is consumed.
4th line (Utility from Potential Earnings at Home): The present discounted value of
migrants￿ utility from their earnings in their home country would depend on their age at
return as well as the average earnings level in that country.
3.3 SOLUTION OF THE MODEL
3.3.1 Decision Period
Since the number of the state space points at which the problem needs to be solved depends
on the decision horizon, we take the decision period as two years to alleviate the computa-
tional requirement. The decision spell starts when a migrant enters Germany and goes until
he dies14 or returns to his home country.
3.3.2 Choice Set
The savings decision, which is a continuous choice variable, is discretized into 10 separate
values. {A = At+1  At = {{A1,{A2,..,{A10} where {A denotes the discretized level of
savings. Therefore, the choice set has 11 elements:




￿ lagged labor market status: lt31
14We assume that all migrants die at age 75.
13￿ duration of residence: t
￿ age at entry: age0
￿ nationality: z
￿ duration of residence at 1983: t1983
￿ permanent characteristic: type 15
￿ t = (#s
t,#
y
t) : vector of contemporaneous shocks to location-speci￿c preferences and




















Initial Conditions: {A0,age0,l31 = 1}




t) and e St = (At,lt,,t,age0,z,t1983,type).
3.3.4 Solution of the Migrants￿ Problem
Migrants maximize the present discounted value of their lifetime utility. We write the mi-
grants￿ problem in a dynamic programming framework and solve it by backward induction.
Given the current realizations of their earnings and location speci￿c preferences, migrants
calculate the value of staying in Germany and the value of returning to the home country





t ( e St)}
Above, V S
t (St) denotes the value of staying and V L
t ( e St) denotes the value of leaving for
the home country.
Value of Staying in Germany The value of staying can be written as the maximum
over the value functions that correspond to the dierent savings alternatives.
V
S







15We group migrants into a ￿nite number of types according to their permanent characteristics.




t (St) = max
At+1
{u(At+1,t) + BEtVt+1(St+1)}
s.t. ct + At+1  yt + (1 + r)At
ct  cmin, At  0
where B is the discount factor. The solution to this problem is given by the following
decision rule:
At+1  At = D(St)
The last period in the problem, the Bellman equation we solve is slightly dierent in the
sense that the continuation value is now a bequest function that depends on the level of
assets, type and average number of children for that nationality.
V
S
T (ST) = max
AT+1
{u(AT+1,T) + BB(AT+1,type,z)}
s.t. cT + AT+1  yT + (1 + r)AT
cT  cmin, AT  0
154 DATA
The data set we use is the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). This is a longitudinal
dataset of households in Germany that contains an oversampled group of immigrants from
￿ve Mediterranean countries, of which three are members of the European Union (Greece,
Italy and Spain) and two are not (Turkey and Ex-Yugoslavia). We use the 2000 version
of the GSOEP, which contains annual information from 1984 to 2000 on return migration,
earnings, labor market status and savings16 as well as retrospective information on labor
market status. There are 1326 households in the initial sample.
There are two shortcomings in this data set. One is that the initial sample of immigrants
is a random sample of the immigrants in Germany in 1984. Since some immigrants already
returned to their home country by 1984, this is not a random sample of the initial cohorts
of immigrants. Therefore, the information on their return behavior, for instance, within the
￿rst ten years only comes from the immigrants who entered Germany after 1975. (The ￿rst
return we observe is in 1985.) This implies that when we compute the Kaplan-Meier hazard
functions for return, we assume that there are no cohort eects.
Another issue in the data with regard to our model is that there is no information about
asset holdings. However, we do know their annual savings. To deal with this problem, we use
a particular estimation method that solves the problem of missing state variables in dynamic
panel data models.
The sample we use is restricted to males who entered Germany after the age of 18. We
want to analyze the behavior of immigrants who made the choice to immigrate to Germany.
That is why we drop the immigrants who were younger than 18 at the time of entry to
Germany, who presumably could not have made the decision to migrate themselves, but were
tied movers along with their family. After this restriction, we are left with 1040 household
heads.
16Savings information is available only after 1991.
165 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
5.1 RETURN DECISION
5.1.1 Kaplan Meier Survival and Hazard Functions According to EU Status:
Figure 5.1.1 displays the survivor function conditional on staying for one period (two years)
according to EU status.17 There is a signi￿cant dierence in the return behavior of EU and
non-EU migrants. Migrants from wealthier countries (EU countries) are more likely to go
back. Conditional on staying for 2 years, 45% of the non-EU migrants return within the
next 40 years while around 75% of the EU migrants return.
SURVIVOR FUNCTION BY EU STATUS
period
 KM survivor function for nonEU  KM survivor function for EU







In order to examine the dierences in the timing of return migration according to EU
status, we next compare the hazard functions.
17We do not show it for the 1st period and after the 19th period because the sample sizes are too small.
In addition, for non-EU migrants, return at very early years of residence may not be a choice but rather an
obligation. (One can apply for permanent residence permits after 5 years.) Among the non-EU migrants,
the earliest return we observe is at the 2nd period (2-4 years). Therefore, it is assumed that somebody
who survives 2 years in Germany can freely make his return choice. Paine (1974) reports that, in practice,
migrants who survived the ￿rst couple of years in Germany were able to stay.
17HAZARD CONTRIBUTION BY EU STATUS
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Figure 5.1.2 displays a comparison of the Kaplan-Meier hazard functions according to
EU status. We see a dierence in the hazard rates of EU and non-EU migrants up to the
4th period (within the ￿rst 8 years) and again after 13th period (after 24 years of residence).
Between 8 to 24 years of residence, there is no signi￿cant dierence in the return behavior
according to the EU status. Higher return rates in earlier periods for EU migrants suggests
that disappointment factor plays a stronger role in the return of EU migrants. Since the
opportunity cost of returning, the wage dierential between Germany and the home country,
is smaller for EU migrants, there is a smaller dierence between the value of staying and
value of leaving. Therefore, a negative shock to either the earnings or the preferences is more
likely to push the value of leaving above the value of staying. Another important dierence
in the hazard functions is that while the return rates show a downward trend for non-EU
migrants after 11th period, they actually increase for EU migrants.
5.2 SAVINGS DECISION
Figures 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 display savings and income pro￿les of all immigrants by quartiles 18
Savings of immigrants demonstrate a clear downward trend over their duration of residence.
Their income levels play no role in this decline as we can see from the income graph that mi-
grants￿ median income, in fact, rises until the 11th period. The savings pro￿le of immigrants
18We have no information on savings for less than 5 periods since the survey contains this information
only after 1991. The ￿gure for income is drawn for the same periods for comparison.
18is relatively constant between the 9th and 16th periods, before decreasing again after 16th
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INCOME - ALL MIGRANTS
period
 (p 50) income  (p 75) income
 (p 25) income






Selection in return migration could be one reason for the decrease in immigrants￿ savings.
If the return is in fact part of an optimal life cycle plan of asset accumulation in the host
country, we would expect the returners to save more than the stayers. After the 10th period,
this trend becomes much weaker as the fraction of people with high propensity to return in
19the sample decreases. Now, most migrants￿ savings behavior is more like natives￿ savings
behavior. It more closely follows their income pro￿le and there is a downward trend at old
age.
One confounding factor may be the time eects on migrants￿ income. A higher fraction
of the people for whom we utilize the information to draw the above graph on the left-hand
side come from later year-of-entry cohorts. Therefore, they potentially have higher lifetime
incomes which would allow them to save more. However, the initial downward trend is too
precipitous for this to be the case and this would not explain why the pro￿le levels o after
some time before decreasing at the end again.
5.2.1 Savings By EU Status
A disaggregation of savings and income behavior according to immigrants￿ EU status is
illustrated below in Figures 5.2.3 and 5.2.4. The most striking fact when we compare the
savings behavior of EU and non-EU migrants is the dierence in the pro￿les over duration
over residence. There is a signi￿cant decrease in the savings of non-EU migrants while the
savings of EU migrants seem to be relatively constant over time. Between the 5th and 8th
periods, non-EU migrants save on average more than EU migrants even though their income
levels are very similar. However, after the 11th period, EU migrants save more than non-EU
migrants despite similar levels of income on average.
MEDIAN INCOME BY EU STATUS
period
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20MEDIAN SAVINGS BY EU STATUS
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This savings behavior seems to be consistent with the hazard rates shown above in a
model where the motivation to return comes from accumulated assets. The hazard function
for the non-EU migrants reaches the peak of its hump at the 8th period. What we see in the
above savings pro￿le is that their savings are the highest before 8th period. After the 8th
period, as the savings pro￿le moves downward, the return rate also goes down for non-EU
migrants. After the 12th period, both the return rates and savings of non-EU migrants are
much lower than those of EU migrants. This suggests that a much smaller fraction of people
with high propensity to return is left in the sample for non-EU migrants during this time.
On the other hand, the hazard function for EU migrants displays an increase after the 12th
period. When we look at their savings behavior, we see that EU migrants maintain their
previous level of savings in this interval. This suggests that unlike the non-EU migrants,
there still exists a sizeable proportion of returners in the pool of EU migrants even after the
12th period.
216 ESTIMATION METHOD
The outcomes we observe in the data are:
￿ the return migration choice made by the migrant. (mt)
￿ the savings choice made by the migrant. (At+1  At)
￿ the earnings of the migrant. (yt)
￿ the labor market status of the migrant. (lt)
Let {Oi} = {Di,Xi} denote observed outcomes for individual i, where Di = {dit} =
{{mit},{Ait  Ait31}} is the history of observed choices and Xi = {xit} = {{lit},{yit}} is
the history of observed exogenous covariates.
The data are:




















where ti,19xx is the period number for individual i in 19xx and Ti is the last period in the
sample for individual i. If the return choice is to leave, for that period we do not observe
the other outcomes.
One of the endogenous state variables, assets, is not observed. Therefore, we use the
method introduced by Keane and Wolpin (2001) for estimating dynamic panel data models
with unobserved endogenous state variables. Typically, calculation of the probabilities that
form the likelihood function requires conditioning on past state variables. The novel feature
of this method is that it obviates the need to calculate these conditional probabilities. The
underlying idea of this estimation method is to minimize the distance between the simulated
and reported outcomes. A measure of the distance between the simulated and reported
outcomes is constructed by assuming that the observed outcomes are measured with error.
In a recent paper, Keane and Sauer (2003) show that this estimator has good small sample
properties in a more extended setting.
The key assumption, therefore, is that the observed outcomes are measured with error.
By acknowledging the existence of measurement errors (classi￿cation errors in the case of
discrete outcomes), we are incorporating into our likelihood calculation, for instance, the
22fact that when a migrant is observed as employed, there is a positive probability that he was
in fact unemployed, but his employment status was classi￿ed incorrectly in the data. In the
case of observed earnings and savings, we take a similar approach; however, in this case the
measurement errors have continuous distributions.
6.1 Generation of Simulated Outcomes






















n=1 = Xsim for each individual i.
￿ Using the simulated values19, construct the unbiased classi￿cation error rates for the








The contribution to the likelihood of individual i is calculated by the below simulator,
which is the probability of observing the reported outcomes conditional on the simulated
outcomes averaged over the N simulated choice histories.
19We do not have information on assets at the time of entry to Germany. The very fact that these
people chose to immigrate to Germany suggests that they did not hold signi￿cant assets when they entered
Germany. However, in order to capture the dierences in this that may arise due to dierences at age of
entry or country of origin, we write it as a deterministic function in these two variables.
A0 = 0 + 1I(z  3) + 2age0 + 3age0I(z  3)




















in ) is not conditional on any of the state variables.
Therefore, we can calculate this probability even if we do not observe some of the state
variables.
Unobserved heterogeneity enters the estimation in the following way: We assume that
there is a ￿nite number (K) of type groups. Each individual i may belong to any of these
type groups, 1 to K. It is the probability of being a certain type that diers across individu-
als. Therefore, when we generate the simulated outcomes for individual i and calculate the
above simulator, we do it for all types. Then, the likelihood contribution for this individual
is calculated as the weighted average of the above simulator over the probabilities of his























where Vi,k, the probability of individual i being of type k, is speci￿ed as a logit with age
at entry and country of origin as arguments.
Vk = V(age0,z,t1983)
The probability of observing the reported spells conditional on the simulated spells can




























We use the measurement error distributions and classi￿cation error rates to calculate
these probabilities. See appendix B for these calculations. For the optimization method,
we use the Downhill Simplex Algorithm.
247 RESULTS
In this section, we present our maximum likelihood estimation results based on the full
solution of the dynamic model.
7.1 Model Fit
We ￿rst illustrate and discuss how our model￿s predictions as to the return migration and
savings behavior of immigrants ￿t the observed features of the data.
7.1.1 Return Migration
Hazard Contribution By EU Status Figure 7.1.1 compares the actual and predicted
hazard contribution for non-EU immigrants Both the level and the shape of the predicted
hazard function match the data reasonably well. Our model certainly captures the hump
shape of the hazard function. The only signi￿cant dierence between the actual and predicted
hazard rates exist within the ￿rst 5 periods. The sample size is rather small in this range
since most of the immigrants in our sample entered Germany before 1973. The low hazard
rates in the sample is probably due to the size of the sample.20
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The model matches the hazard function of EU migrants well as shown below in Figure
7.1.2. It captures the decreasing pro￿le in the early part of the graph. The predicted levels in
20Paine (1974) reports much higher hazard rates in the early periods for non-EU migrants.
25the 2nd and 3rd periods are somewhat lower, though.21 The model also matches the steady
hazard rates around 5% in the middle part of the graph. Even though the predicted hazard
rates exhibit an increase after the 15th period, it is weaker compared to what we observe
in the data. The spike in the data after the 15th period could also be due to the smaller
sample size in this range.
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Survival Rates By Nationality In Table 7.1.1, the model￿s predictions on survivor rates
after 20 periods are compared to the actual values by nationality. 22 As can be seen from
the table, the predictions match the actual values very well for all nationalities.
TABLE 7.1.1: SURVIVOR RATES AFTER 40 YEARS
Turkish Yugoslavian Greek Italian Spanish
Actual* 30.4% 58.7% 22.6% 30.7% 21.5%
Predicted 30.0% 57.7% 22.4% 30.5% 22.0%
* Actual values are parametric (log-logistic). 
7.1.2 Savings
Figures 7.1.3 and 7.1.4 display how the predicted savings from our model compare to the
actual savings according to immigrants￿ EU status.
21The sample size is small for these periods.
22The actual survivor rates are parametric as the sample size by nationality is too small to calculate
nonparametric hazard rates.
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Our model captures the downward sloping pro￿le of the mean savings of non-EUmigrants.
However, the level of savings is signi￿cantly overpredicted between the 7th and 10th periods
and somewhat overpredicted between the 11th and 17th periods. In terms of ￿tting the level
of savings, we do much better with the EU migrants. Except for the 8th and 9th periods,
our predictions are close the values in the data. In addition, our model also captures the
￿atness of the savings of the EU migrants until the 16th period -there is a somewhat of a
slope at the beginning in our predictions, though-.as well as the downward slope after that.
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277.2 Interpretation of Types
There are two types of immigrants, distinguished with respect to their permanent character-
istics as to their psychic cost of living in Germany, their risk aversion and bequest motive.
The estimated parameters indicate that type 1￿s have a higher psychic cost at time zero that
decreases at a faster rate by duration of residence in Germany. Their psychic cost at all
periods of residence is higher despite the faster decline. Type 1￿s are also more risk averse;
but have a weaker bequest motive.
In order to better understand the dynamics underlying the return migration and savings
behavior of immigrants illustrated above and to interpret the results of the policy experiments
of next section, we should understand the dierences in the behavior of the two types. We
should also keep in mind that dierences in the out-migration rates change the percentage
of each type in the population over time.
Table 7.2.1 reports the hazard contribution for type 1 immigrants. Examining the hazard
rates of type 1 immigrants reveals a hump-shaped pro￿le. The peak of the hump varies by
nationality. For non-EU migrants who face lower prices after return, the peak takes place
earlier (9th to10th periods) compared to that for EU migrants(11th to 12th periods). The
level of the hazard rates and the peak is higher for EU migrants. We also observe that the
hazard rates for EU migrants in the earlier periods are very high. The biggest dierence
between the hazard rates of EU and non-EU migrants is in these earlier periods. This
dierence dies down as the number of periods increases. Another interesting fact is that
even though the survivor rate of type 1 Spanish immigrants after 20 periods (0.6%) is lower
than that for type 1 Italian immigrants (0.7%), the hazard rate in the initial periods for
Italian migrants is much higher. This is mostly due to higher expected earnings in Italy. In
the initial periods -when most of the immigrants are young-, the expected earnings back at
home has a stronger bite.
28TABLE 7.2.1: HAZARD CONTRIBUTION OF TYPE 1 IMMIGRANTS
Period Turkish Yugoslavian Greek Italian Spanish
1 0.099 0.018 0.212 0.319 0.231
2 0.086 0.022 0.174 0.263 0.195
3 0.091 0.030 0.164 0.230 0.185
4 0.107 0.046 0.166 0.222 0.191
5 0.139 0.077 0.184 0.213 0.207
6 0.166 0.099 0.199 0.224 0.228
7 0.197 0.122 0.225 0.247 0.263
8 0.221 0.139 0.248 0.260 0.280
9 0.244 0.141 0.257 0.262 0.299
10 0.240 0.128 0.252 0.256 0.293
11 0.250 0.113 0.267 0.260 0.309
12 0.221 0.091 0.251 0.285 0.315
13 0.211 0.085 0.245 0.259 0.281
14 0.141 0.056 0.173 0.221 0.215
15 0.155 0.052 0.196 0.207 0.207
16 0.097 0.048 0.101 0.140 0.197
17 0.063 0.041 0.076 0.120 0.143
18 0.087 0.034 0.106 0.153 0.198
19 0.061 0.030 0.069 0.107 0.151
20 0.037 0.032 0.032 0.104 0.134
On the other hand, the hazard rates of type 2 immigrants are much lower. As can be seen
from Table 7.2.2, even after 40 years of residence, more than half of the type 2 immigrants
remain in Germany for all nationalities. This implies that as the number periods increase,
the fraction of type 2 immigrants will increase as well. As a result, the behavioral features of
type 2 immigrants will start to dominate. Since the hazard rates for type 1 EU immigrants
are higher, this eect will be stronger for EU immigrants.
TABLE 7.2.2: SURVIVOR RATES AFTER 40 YEARS BY TYPE
Turkish Yugoslavian Greek Italian Spanish
Type 1 0.040 0.229 0.018 0.007 0.006
Type 2 0.631 0.864 0.544 0.531 0.530
When we examined the hazard functions according to migrants￿ EU status, we observed
that non-EU migrants of all types had a hump-shaped hazard pro￿le whereas EU migrants
of all types had a downward sloping pro￿le that got leveled o after some time. The reason
to this is the change in the type composition as explained in the above paragraph. As
can be seen from Table 7.2.3, the out-selection of type 1 immigrants is stronger among EU
immigrants; therefore, the hazard rates of type 2 immigrants start to dominate much earlier,
pulling the hump-shaped pro￿le of type 1 immigrants to much lower levels. In addition to
29that, the hump of the type 1 EU immigrants take place at a later period compared to the
hump of type 1 non-EU immigrants; therefore, there has been stronger out-selection of type
1 EU immigrants during the hump range.
TABLE 7.2.3: PROPORTION OF TYPE 1 IMMIGRANTS BY PERIOD
period Turkish Yugoslavian Greek Italian Spanish
0 0.768 0.537 0.868 0.530 0.834
4 0.690 0.509 0.753 0.266 0.680
8 0.506 0.396 0.550 0.118 0.423
12 0.271 0.285 0.294 0.042 0.160
16 0.182 0.244 0.184 0.020 0.074
20 0.175 0.235 0.176 0.015 0.051
Table 7.2.4 reports the mean savings of type 1 immigrants. Given their income and
minimum consumption level determined by their family size, these immigrants basically save
whatever they can. On average, their savings rate is almost around 40% till the 10th period.
23 Spanish and Yugoslavian immigrants can save more each period mainly due to their
higher earnings and smaller family size. Another important thing to notice in this table is
the timing of the fast decline. The decline takes place earlier for Turkish and Yugoslavian
immigrants who face lower prices after they return to their home country.
TABLE 7.2.4: MEAN SAVINGS OF TYPE 1 IMMIGRANTS
Period Turkish Yugoslavian Greek Italian Spanish
0 22,863         31,354         23,455         23,090         32,285        
1 25,318         33,623         25,941         25,633         34,577        
2 26,951         34,791         27,618         27,281         36,249        
3 27,944         35,874         28,643         27,899         36,913        
4 29,345         37,526         30,247         29,968         39,366        
5 31,201         40,153         32,033         31,323         41,410        
6 31,691         41,229         32,831         32,214         42,558        
7 33,708         41,964         35,156         35,073         45,453        
8 33,361         35,114         35,009         35,137         45,106        
9 34,159         22,575         36,251         36,002         44,944        
10 29,309         11,393         32,766         35,444         37,780        
11 17,867         3,878           24,753         32,862         25,572        
12 7,075           514              13,596         27,833         13,812        
13 1,408           136              4,806           18,782         4,734          
14 317              76                733              8,008           532             
15 121              80                16                1,792           18               
23In fact, such high savings rates have been reported in the literature of guest-workers. (Kumcu,
Paine(1974))
30On the other hand, the savings pro￿le of type 2￿s is rather ￿at and the levels are much
lower. Per period savings of type 2 immigrants of all nationalities never exceed 15,000DM
and are lower than 10,000DM for most of the range. The reason that we observe a stronger
downward slope in the savings pro￿le of non-EU immigrants is the same reason as above.
Since type1 EU immigrants have higher hazard rates compared to type 1 non-EU immigrants,
non-EU migrants have a higher fraction of type 1￿s left after the 5th period . As a result,
the savings behavior of type 1 immigrants, a downward sloping pro￿le, is more prominent
among the non-EU migrants.
7.3 Implications of the Results
Here, we discuss two important implications of immigrants￿ return and savings behavior. One
is important from the host country￿s perpective, the timing of immigrants￿ return pertaining
to the social security system in the host country, and the other is important from the source
countries￿ perpective, how much assets immigrants bring with them when they return.
7.3.1 Social Security Contributions and Bene￿ts
An important policy question from the host country￿s perpective is what fraction of these
immigrants leave before they qualify for pension bene￿ts. Table 7.3.1 presents the cumulative
hazard rates -one minus the survival rates- by the end of second and third periods. The reason
we choose the second and third periods is that, in Germany, the minimum number of years
of labor market experience to qualify for pension bene￿ts is 5 years. All immigrants who
left by the end of the second period (within the ￿rst 4 years) did not qualify before they
left. Some of the immigrants who left in the third period (￿fth or sixth year of residence in
Germany) did not qualify as well.
TABLE 7.3.1: CUMULATIVE HAZARD RATES
EU Non-EU
2nd period 27.7% 9.3%
3rd period 33.7% 13.1%
As we see from the above table, almost a third of EU immigrants leave before they qualify;
whereas, the fraction is around one tenth for non-EU immigrants. Of course, in terms of
immigrants contributions and withdrawals from the social security contribution, the timing
of return of immigrants is important even after they qualfy for bene￿ts because although an
31immigrant who returns after 6 years of residence24 will receive bene￿ts, these bene￿ts will
be very small.
7.3.2 Asset Accumulation
Figure 7.3.1 compares the asset levels of stayers and returners for Turkish immigrants. We
see that immigrants who choose to return hold signi￿cantly higher assets. Although it is
shown here only for Turkish immigrants, it holds for all other nationalities as well.
We observe a peak because in that range most of the leavers are type 1 immigrants, who
have high propensity to save and those who leave at later periods have higher assets simply
because they took a longer time to do so. However, as type 1 immigrants get older and
there remains a shorter lifetime horizon, their savings rate goes down. In addition, among
the type 1￿s, the ones with higher assets are selected (already returned). Therefore, their
asset pro￿le becomes ￿atter and eventually goes down. Moreover, at later periods there is a
higher proportion of type 2 immigrants among the returners. Because of these three factors,
the assets pro￿les of returners take a sharp downturn.
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Table 7.3.2 reports the average asset level of a returner (which is calculated by weighting
the values in the above graph by the hazard rates). Even though the average level of assets
24Since everybody is willing to be employed in our model, duration of residence is equal to the duration
in the labor market. In Germany, periods of unemployment are included in the social security contribution
period.
32of a Spanish return migrant is lower than that of non-EU returners, when we look at the
assets pro￿le of the returners over duration of residence, we see that at each period Spanish
return migrants take home more assets. However, the average over the all periods is lower
because a much higher fraction of Spanish immigrants return home at the early periods.
TABLE 7.3.2: AVERAGE ASSET LEVEL OF A RETURNER
Turkish Yugoslavian Greek Italian Spanish
156,085       193,955       130,363       115,548       153,922      
Table 7.3.3 reports the average assets that return to the host country from all immigrants
that leave for the host country. Spanish workers who leave their country to work in the host
country bring back the highest amount of assets because they are more likely to return and
their returners accumulate more assets in the host country. Despite the fact that Greek
immigrants are more likely to return compared to Turkish immigrants, Turkish immigrants
bring back more due to higher assets of their returners.
TABLE 7.3.3: AVERAGE RETURN ASSET LEVEL FROM ALL IMMI-
GRANTS
Turkish Yugoslavian Greek Italian Spanish
109,260       82,043         101,162       80,306         120,059      
8 POLICY EXPERIMENTS
8.1 Changes in the Replacement Rate of Unemployment Bene￿ts
Table 8.1.1 reports how the return behavior of immigrants respond to the changes in the
replacement rate of the unemployment compensation system. The experiments indicate
that migrants￿ return decision is relatively sensitive to the replacement rate. A drop in the
replacement rate from 0.6 to 0.5 decreases the survivor rate after 40 years among Turkish
migrants from 30.0% to 28.6%. Although the unemployment rate among the Italian and
Spanish immigrants is much lower, this policy is almost as eective in decreasing their
survivor rate. It goes down from 30.5% to 29.3% for Italian immigrants and from 22.0% to
21.4% for Spanish immigrants. On the other hand, the policy is much less eective with the
Yugoslavian workers despite their higher unemployment rates compared to the Italian and
Spanish immigrants.
33Decreasing the replacement rate further below 0.5 to 0.4 has no eect on the survivor
rate of Turkish immigrants whereas it is still eective on the Italian and Spanish immigrants.
This result is due to the social assistance that the German government provides which makes
sure that immigrants￿ income do not fall below the subsistence level. As shown in the model
section, this assistance depends on migrants￿ family size. Since Turkish migrants have on
average larger families, their subsistence income is higher. Consequently, as we decrease
the unemployment replacement rate, this subsistence income becomes binding at a higher
replacement rate for Turkish immigrants. For instance, decreasing the replacement rate even
more to 0.3 has little eect on the survivor rate of any immigrant group. Once we lower it
to 0.2, there is no eect at all.
TABLE 8.1.1: EFFECT OF REPLACEMENT RATE ON THE SURVIVOR
RATE AFTER 40 YEARS
Turkish Yugoslavian Greek Italian Spanish
0.6(Baseline) 30.0% 57.7% 22.4% 30.5% 22.0%
0.55 29.3% 57.5% 22.2% 29.9% 21.7%
0.5 28.6% 57.2% 22.1% 29.3% 21.4%
0.4 28.6% 56.7% 22.0% 28.6% 20.7%
0.3 28.6% 56.5% 22.0% 28.6% 20.6%
0.2 28.6% 56.5% 22.0% 28.6% 20.6%
The interesting result from this policy experiment is that it has a stronger impact on
immigrants from EU countries despite their lower unemployment rates. One reason to this,
as explained above, is the fact that the subsistence bene￿ts EU migrants receive is lower
due to their smaller family size. As a result, the policy changes the income levels of a larger
fraction of EUmigrants. However, even before the subsistence income becomes binding, when
we decrease the replacement rate to 0.5, for Italian and Spanish immigrants the program is
more eective compared to Yugoslavian immigrants, who have higher unemployment rates,
and as much eective as it is for Turkish immigrants, who have much higher unemployment
rates. Understanding this result requires further investigation of the eect of the policy
experiment by type.
34TABLE 8.1.2: EFFECT OF REPLACEMENT RATE ON THE SURVIVOR
RATE AFTER 40 YEARS BY TYPE
Turkish Yugoslavian Greek Italian Spanish
Type 1 0.6(baseline) 4.0% 22.9% 1.8% 0.7% 0.6%
0.5 3.9% 21.8% 1.8% 0.7% 0.6%
% Change 2.50% 4.80% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Type 2 0.6(baseline) 63.1% 86.4% 54.4% 53.1% 53.0%
0.5 60.2% 86.2% 53.5% 50.8% 51.5%
% Change 4.59% 0.23% 1.65% 4.33% 2.83%
Overall % Change 4.67% 0.86% 1.34% 3.93% 2.73%
As can be seen in Table 8.1.2, a decrease in the replacement rate from 0.6 to 0.5 has a
stronger eect on type 2 immigrants of all nationalities except for Yugoslavian immigrants.
Since most of the type 1 immigrants choose to return within the 40 year period anyway, the
policy has a lesser eect on them.
At ￿rst, one might think that the stronger impact of the policy on Italian and Spanish
immigrants compared to Yugoslavian immigrants -despite the higher unemployment rates
among the latter group- would be due to the dierences in the type proportions. In the
above table, we see that type 2 immigrants are more responsive to the policy and there is
a larger fraction of type 2 Italian immigrants at any period and a larger fraction type 2
Spanish immigrants after the 9th period when the unemployment rates start to peak. This
fact is true; however, there is a secondary eect as well.
Even when we condition on type 2 immigrants, we see that the impact of the policy
is much stronger for Italian and Spanish immigrants compared to Yugoslavian immigrants.
The reason to this is the dierence between the value of spending the rest of one￿s life in
his home country and the value of staying in Germany. This dierence is much smaller for
type 2 Italian and Spanish immigrants. Therefore, a decrease in the value of staying in
Germany due to smaller unemployment bene￿ts has a stronger bite in the return decisions
of these migrants. It is the same reason why the policy is not so much more eective for
Turks. However, compared to Yugoslavian immigrants, Turks response is stronger because
the unemployment rate among them is higher and the dierence between the value functions
is not as acute as that for the Yugoslavian immigrants.
We would expect the additional returners -people who are induced to return as a result of
the change in the compensation system- to be selected from immigrants that are more likely
to be unemployed; thereby, decreasing the unemployment rates of immigrants that stay.
The below table compares the unemployment rates of Italian immigrants under dierent
35replacement rates. What we ￿nd is that the impact of a decrease in the replacement rate on
the unemployment rates of immigrants is negligible.
8.2 Financial Bonuses to Encourage Return
8.2.1 Bonuses Given Before Migrants Qualify for Pension Bene￿ts
Financial bonuses given to immigrants conditional on return to their home country at the
end of second period (4 years of residence) would relieve the host country from paying
pension bene￿ts to these immigrants. Table 8.2.1 presents the eect of such bonuses on
the hazard rates at the second period. As can be seen from the table, the policy makes a
strong impact on the second period hazard rates. The impact of the bonus depends on the
purchasing power parity of the source countries with Germany. While a bonus of 10,000DM
increases the hazard rate of Turkish immigrants by 35%, it does so only by 17% for Italian
immigrants. We also ￿nd diminishing returns to the amount of bonuses given. The second
and third 10,000DM increment of bonus increase the hazard rate of Italian immigrants by
15% and 13%, respectively.
TABLE 8.2.1: HAZARD RATES AT THE SECOND PERIOD WITH DIF-
FERENT BONUSES
Turkish Yugoslavian Greek Italian Spanish
Baseline 6.0% 1.2% 12.0% 10.6% 12.9%
10,000     8.1% (35%) 1.8% (50%) 14.7% (23%) 12.4% (17%) 15.4% (19%)
20,000     10.8% (33%) 2.5% (39%) 17.8% (21%) 14.2% (15%) 18.0% (17%)
30,000     13.9% (29%) 3.5% (40%) 21.0% (18%) 16.0% (13%) 20.7% (15%)
Numbers in paranthesis are percentage changes from previous line. 
The impact of this ￿nancial bonus would not be limited to the period it is given, though.
Many of the immigrants who choose to accept the ￿nancial oer and return to their home
country would have done so anyway, albeit later. Figure 8.2.1 shows the impact of a
20,000DM bonus on the hazard function of Turkish immigrants. What we see is that after
the spike in the second period as a result of the bonus, the hazard rates are lower compared
to the baseline values.
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Only some of the immigrants who accept the oer are those who would stay in Germany
throughout their lives. In order to see this longer term eect of ￿nancial bonuses, we compare
the cumulative hazard rates from the 2nd period, when the ￿nancial bonus is given, to the
end of the 20th period. Table 8.2.2 reports these cumulative values for the baseline case
and for the case with a 30,000DM bonus. When we compare the changes in the cumulative
hazard rates with the ￿nancial bonus according to nationality groups, we realize that the
ordering that we saw in the previous table according to purchasing power parities is lost. In
fact, the percentage change is lower for Turkish immigrants compared to all EU nationalities
and it is higher for Italian compared to Yugoslavian immigrants.
TABLE 8.2.2: CUMULATIVE HAZARD RATES FROM THE 2ND TO THE
20TH PERIODS
Turkish Yugoslavian Greek Italian Spanish
ALL Baseline 67.5% 41.7% 72.5% 62.8% 72.6%
30,000 68.0% 42.0% 73.0% 63.3% 73.1%
Change 0.65% 0.72% 0.68% 0.83% 0.69%
Type 1 Baseline 95.6% 76.7% 97.7% 99.0% 99.2%
30,000 96.0% 77.6% 98.1% 99.3% 99.5%
Change 0.46% 1.20% 0.39% 0.30% 0.26%
Type 2 Baseline 36.8% 13.5% 45.3% 45.7% 46.5%
30,000 37.0% 13.5% 45.5% 46.4% 46.8%
Change 0.54% 0.00% 0.44% 1.58% 0.67%
The reason to this becomes clear when we examine the cumulative hazard rates according
to the types. Among those who return to their home country, type 2 immigrants contain a
37larger share who would not return to their home country in the next 38 years but do return
as a result of the bonus. In addition, within the type 2 immigrants, the percentage change
in the cumulative hazard rate is higher among those coming from EU countries.
What we learn from this is that even though the immediate impact of ￿nancial bonuses
would be stronger for immigrants coming from countries that have lower prices, the longer
term impact may not go in the same way because such a policy is more likely to change the
return decision (over their lifetime) of immigrants with lower propensity to leave. What we
also learned is that among those immigrants with lower propensity to leave, it is more likely
to change the behavior of immigrants from wealthier countries. Consequently, depending
on the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity, this policy may end up bringing about a
stronger change in the decision as to whether or not to return among the immigrants from
wealthier countries. On the other hand, if that period has some particular importance -the
second period has because it is right before migrants qualify for pension bene￿ts-, such a
policy is more likely to be successful among immigrants from poorer countries.
8.2.2 Bonuses Targeted Toward the Unemployed
Given the high unemployment rates in Germany both for immigrants and natives, it may
be of interest to the German government to implement policies to encourage unemployed
immigrants to return to their home country. Since unemployed immigrant workers will be
drawing signi￿cant bene￿ts from the unemployment insurance system and they will be likely
to be unemployed in the future as well, it might make sense to pay an amount close to their
unemployment bene￿ts conditional on return.
In this policy experiment, an immigrant is oered the choice of receiving a bonus con-
ditional on return whenever he is unemployed. Unlike the previous policy experiment,
which was given at one period only, this policy is available to immigrants at all periods,
restricted only to the unemployed, though. Table 8.2.3 presents the impact of bonuses equal
to 30,000DM and 50,000DM -which is the range of unemployment bene￿ts per period for
most immigrants- on the survivor rates after 40 years. We ￿nd a noticable drop in the sur-
vivor rates. With a 50,000DM bonus, the survivor rate of Turkish immigrants goes down
27.8% from 30.0% and that of Italian immigrants drops to 29.4% from 30.5%. Compared
to the policy experiment regarding decreasing the replacement rate of the unemployment
compensation system from 0.6 to 0.5, this ￿nancial bonus policy of 50,000DM to the unem-
ployed is more eective in decreasing the survivor rate for Turkish, Yugoslavian and Greek
38immigrants whereas for Italian and Spanish immigrants the impact of two policies are about
the same.
TABLE 8.2.3: SURVIVOR RATE AFTER 40 YEARS WITH BONUSES TO
THE UNEMPLOYED
Turkish Yugoslavian Greek Italian Spanish
Baseline 30.0% 57.7% 22.4% 30.5% 22.0%
30,000 28.7% 57.1% 22.0% 29.9% 21.7%
50,000 27.8% 56.7% 21.7% 29.4% 21.4%
The result of our simulations also indicate that this policy would be successful in selecting
out the unemployed immigrants from the immigrant pool in Germany. We observe a notice-
able decrease in the unemployment rate of immigrants from all ￿ve country of origin groups.
In the below graph, we show the change in the unemployment rate of Italian immigrants.
For instance, at the 18th period, the unemployment rate falls from 16.1% to 15.2%.
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In the policy experiment, in which we decreased the replacement rate of the unemploy-
ment compensation system to 0.4 from 0.6, the survivor rate of Italian immigrants went
down to 28.6% from 30.5%. In the above policy experiment, where we gave unemployed
immigrants a bonus of 50,000DM conditional on return, the survivor rate of Italian immi-
grants went down to only 29.4%. On the other hand, in the former policy experiment, there
was a negligible impact on the unemployment rate of immigrants who stayed in Germany
39whereas in the latter policy, as shown in the above graph, there was a noticeable change
in the unemployment rate of immigrants who stayed. It is not surprising that the former
policy, despite the fact that it drove out more immigrants, had a weaker impact on the un-
employment rate because changing the replacement rate of the unemployment compensation
system changes the lifetime income of both employed and unemployed immigrants whereas
in the latter policy the impact is only on the unemployed immigrants by design.
9 MACROECONOMIC COUNTERFACTUALS
9.1 Changes in Wages in Germany
In this section, we analyze the eect of a change in the rental price of human capital in
Germany on immigrants￿ return and savings decisions. The theoretical impact of an increase
in the rental price on migrants￿ return decision is ambiguous. On one hand, a higher income
in Germany allows the immigrants to save faster and, therefore, have a higher asset level at
each period making them more likely to return to their home country. On the other hand,
since the opportunity cost of returning increases with higher wages in Germany, they become
more likely to stay.
Figures 9.1.1 and 9.1.2 show the change in the hazard contribution according to EU
status after a 10% increase in German wages. For all immigrants, the hazard rates in the
￿rst couple of periods are lower. The ability to save at a faster pace makes the continuation
value of staying in Germany higher in the very early periods and, as a result, the hazard
rates decline for all immigrant groups.
However, for non-EU immigrants, after the second period, the hazard function increases
at a faster pace making the hump more pronounced and decreases at a faster pace as well
before leveling down at a lower level than that of the baseline. On the other hand, the new
hazard function is lower at each period of residence for EU immigrants. The dierence is
very small between the third and seventh periods, though.
40FIGURE 9.1.1 : IMPACT OF AN INCREASE IN GERMAN WAGES ON
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A higher wage level allows type 1 immigrants, who have a high propensity to save, to
accumulate assets at a faster pace. For this group, the income eect dominates and their
hazard rates go up. On the other hand, for type 2 immigrants, the substitution eect
dominates and they become less likely to return. The reason we see the increase in the
hazard rates of non-EU immigrants in the increasing part of the hump is that the increase in
the hazard rates of type 1 immigrants dominate because there is a higher fraction of type 1
immigrants in these earlier periods and the income eect is stronger for non-EU immigrants.
For EU immigrants, as a result of the higher hazard rates, there is a smaller fraction of type
411 immigrants left at each period. In addition, the increase in the hazard rates of type 1
immigrants are not as high as that of non-EU immigrants due to the weaker income eect.
Consequently, at no point in the hazard function we see an increase.
Table 9.1.1 reports the survivor rates after 20 and 40 years of residence with and without
an increase in wages. The interesting result is that after 20 years residence, the survivor rate
of non-EU immigrants do not indicate any signi￿cant dierence despite higher wages in the
host country. In fact, for Yugoslavian immigrants, it slightly decreases.
TABLE 9.1.1: IMPACT OF AN INCREASE IN GERMAN WAGES ON
SURVIVOR RATE
Turkish Yugoslavian Greek Italian Spanish
AFTER 20 YEARS
Baseline 49.2% 72.1% 39.1% 48.8% 38.1%
10% higher 49.5% 71.8% 41.1% 53.5% 41.7%
Change 0.6% -0.4% 5.1% 9.6% 9.4%
AFTER 40 YEARS
Baseline 30.0% 57.7% 22.4% 30.5% 22.0%
10% higher 32.8% 59.1% 25.6% 37.0% 26.8%
Change 8.5% 2.4% 12.5% 17.6% 17.9%
Figures 9.1.3 and 9.1.4 compare the mean savings pro￿le after the increse in wages with
the baseline pro￿le for non-EU and EU immigrants, respectively. Fro non-EU immigrants,
the savings pro￿le becomes steeper and the levels on average become higher; whereas, there
is no signi￿cant change in the savings pro￿le of EU immigrants.
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A higher income level in Germany allows type 1 immigrants, who have high propensity
to save, to accumulate assets at a faster pace yielding a steeper savings pro￿le and higher
assets at each period. On the other hand, since type 2 immigrants have lower propensity
to save, the substitution eect dominates the income eect for them and, therefore, they
become less likely to return. As they become less likely to return, they save less as well.
For both EU and non-EU immigrants, we see higher savings in earlier periods because
type 1 immigrants save more and there is a higher proportion of type 1 immigrants. The ￿rst
crossing of the pro￿les occur because due to higher return rates among type 1 immigrants,
the proportion of type 1￿s remaining in the population decreases and the savings pro￿le of
type 2 immigrants, who save less as a result of the policy, start to dominate. The crossing
takes place at a later point for non-EU immigrants because the income eect is stronger for
them.
The second crossing, where the savings pro￿le with higher wages overtakes the baseline
savings pro￿le, occurs primarily as a result of the change in the savings behavior of type
2 immigrants. As this group of immigrants became less likely to return as a result of the
increase in German wages, they saved less in earlier years of residence in Germany, ending
up with lower assets toward the end of their life-cycle. As a result of this as well as their
bequest motive and higher earnings, they save more after the 10th period.
439.2 Changes in Purchasing Power Parity Between Germany and
the Source Countries
In this counterfactual, we analyze the eect of a change in the purchasing power parity of
Germany with the source countries on the return and savings decisions of immigrants. Since
we do not have time eects in our model, this counterfactual corresponds to the following
question: ￿How would the return and savings behavior of immigrants be dierent if the
ppp over their duration of residence were dierent?￿. Figures 9.2.1 and 9.2.2 display the
hazard contribution with a 10% higher ppp for non-EU and EU immigrants, respectively.
Even though a proportional change implies a larger increase for non-EU immigrants -due
to higher baseline values for ppp-, the impact is stronger for EU immigrants. For non-EU
immigrants, the biggest impact is during the hump of the pro￿le where the level of increase
in the hazard rates is around one percent; whereas, the hazard rates of EU immigrants level
o around 8% instead of 5% after the 4th period. Another eect of the rise in ppp is that
the hazard rates in the ￿rst couple of periods go down because the higher purchasing power
of assets accumulated in Germany make some of the potential early leavers more patient.








































As can be seen from ￿gures 9.2.3 and 9.2.4 that illustrate the mean savings pro￿les of
immigrants by EU status, the stronger impact that we noticed above for EU immigrants￿
hazard rates is synergetic with a stronger impact on their savings decisions. While the mean
savings pro￿les of both immigrant groups become steeper, the impact on EU immigrants￿
savings decisions is much much stronger. In fact, the savings pro￿le of EU immigratns
become even steeper than that of non-EU immigrants.


































The reason that we observe a much stronger impact for EU immigrants is the following:
An increase in the ppp between Germany and the source countries does not have a signi￿-
cant impact on type 1 immigrants of any nationality because these immigrants have a high
propensity to return anyway and save as much as they can even before the increase. Most of
the change in the return and savings behavior we observe is, therefore, caused by the changes
in the behavior of type 2 immigrants. Among the type 2 immigrants, there is a stronger
impact on those originating from EU countries because the dierence between the values of
staying and returning for non-EU immigrants is so high that even though the counterfactual
increases the value of assets after return more for them, the dierence that it makes in their
return decision is still not as big as that of EU immigrants.
We also examined the impact of even higher increases in the purchasing power parity.
Even though the impact of an increase in ppp is at ￿rst strongerforimmigrants fromwealthier
source countries -as can be seen from table 9.2.1, the impact of a 10% increase is strongest
for Italian and Spanish immigrants-, there are stronger diminishing returns for them. As
we increase the ppp by 20% and later 40%, the changes in the survivor rates of Greek and
Turkish immigrants start to catch up with those of Italian and Spanish immigrants.
46TABLE 9.2.1: SURVIVOR RATE AFTER 40 YEARS OF RESIDENCE
WITH DIFFERENT PPP
Turkish Yugoslavian Greek Italian Spanish
Baseline 30.0% 57.7% 22.4% 30.5% 22.0%
10% higher 26.1% 55.6% 19.1% 17.2% 14.7%
20% higher 20.9% 53.9% 14.8% 14.8% 10.1%
40% higher 15.1% 51.1% 10.2% 11.3% 7.6%
Percent Change from the Baseline Value
10% higher 13.0 3.6 14.7 43.6 33.2
20% higher 30.3 6.6 33.9 51.5 54.1
40% higher 49.7 11.4 54.5 63.0 65.5
10 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we estimated a dynamic choice model of joint return migration and savings
behavior, in which the reasons to return include lower prices in the home country, location-
speci￿c preferences and unexpected events. The immigrants whose behavior we analyze
come from ￿ve dierent source countries that dier in terms of their general attractiveness
to live -this could be due to average income level, social amenities, political structure, etc -,
potential earnings of immigrants after return to that country, and purchasing power parity
with Germany. We ￿nd that immigrants from wealthier countries are more likely to return
to their home countries. In addition, immigrants coming from countries with much lower
prices display a hump-shaped hazard function; whereas, immigrants coming from countries
with relatively higher average earnings and better amenities have higher hazard rates in the
earlier years. With respect to the savings behavior of immigrants, we observe a downward
sloping savings pro￿le due to out-selection of those that save more.
A signi￿cant fraction of immigrants who contribute to the pension system leave before
they draw any bene￿ts. For EU immigrants, a remarkable fraction, almost a third of the
immigrants leave before they qualify for pension bene￿ts. For non-EU immigrants, this
fraction is between 9.3 and 13.1 percent.
Immigrants that return hold signi￿cantly higher assets compared to those that stay. The
pro￿le of repatriated assets of return migrants over their duration of residence in Germany
is hump-shaped. We estimate that Turkish immigrants who return to their home country
on average bring 156,085DM with them. The German Interior Ministry reports that around
45,000 Turk left the country annually between 1993 and 1998. Assuming that this roughly
47corresponds to 10,000 households implies that the amount of money that return migrants
brought with them was at around 1.5 billion DM every year.
Decreasing the replacement rate of the unemployment insurance system does not make
a signi￿cant impact on the return behavior of immigrants. In addition, it is not successful
in selecting out the unemployed. In fact, the survival rate of the nationalities with relatively
lower unemployment rates gives as strong -sometimes stronger- response. In addition, there
is a negligible eect on the unemployment rates of immigrants of all nationalities. Targeting
the unemployed with ￿nancial bonuses conditional on return is more eective in selecting
out the unemployed. At the same amount of decrease in the survival rate resulting from
a change in the replacement rate of unemployment compensation, this policy decreases the
unemployment rate more.
Financial bonuses conditional on return before immigrants qualify for pension bene￿ts
are successful in increasing the hazard rates within the intended period. However, many of
the program users are those who would leave in the later periods and the program makes
little change in the cumulative hazard rates after longer periods.
The eect of an increase in the wages of immigrants depends on the relative prices
between Germany and the source country. Immigrants from countries with lower prices
display higher hazard rates during the hump of their hazard function, whereas immigrants
from higher-priced source countries indicate an always lower hazard function. The survival
rate after longer periods of residence increases for all nationalities. Higher wages in the host
country induces immigrants from non-EU countries to save more and their savings pro￿le
takes a steeper decline; whereas, there is no signi￿cant change in either the level or the pro￿le
of the savings of EU immigrants.
An increase in the purchasing power parity between Germany and the source countries
brings about a remarkable increase in both the hazard and savings rates of all immigrant
groups. However, immigrants from EU countries are more responsive to the proportional
changes in the purchasing power parity. There are stronger decreasing returns in the decrease
of the survival rate for EU countries, though.
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50APPENDIX
A DETAILS OF THE ESTIMATION METHOD
The classi￿cation error parameters and parameters that characterize the distribution of mea-
surement errors are estimated along with the other parameters of the model.
A.1 Classi￿cation Errors
A.1.1 Unbiased Classi￿cation Errors
Classi￿cation errors are unbiased when the probability of a particular outcome is the same
in the simulations and the data.
Unbiased Classi￿cation Errors in the Labor Market Outcomes: Let lW
it denote the
observed labor market outcome in the data and lit denote the true value from the simulations.











it = 1|lit 6= 1) = (1  E)b P(lit = 1)) (2)
where






and E is a parameter measuring the extent of classi￿cation error. It is estimated along with
the other parameters of the model.
Unbiasedness of the classi￿cation errors requires that when we substitute equations (1
and 2) into the equation below, we get P(lW
it = i) = P(lit = i).
P(l
W
it = i) = P(l
W
it = i|lit = i)P(lit = i) + P(l
W
it = i|lit = i)P(lit 6= i)
Unbiased Classi￿cation Errors in the Positive Savings: In the solution of our model,
we allow the migrants to dissave. However, in the data we only observe their savings. In
the survey, migrants are ￿rst asked whether or not they saved money; if they did, they are
51then asked the amount of it. Therefore, if either the reported savings choice is nonpositive,
we calculate the probability of observing the reported outcome conditional on the true value
using classi￿cation errors.
Below, equation (3) shows the probability of correct reporting of non-positive savings




1,1 = P(I [(Ait+1  Ait)
W <= 0] = 1 | I [(Ait+1  Ait) <= 0] = 1) (3)
= F + (1  F)b P(I [(Ait+1  Ait) <= 0] = 1)
w
ns
1,0 = P(I [(Ait+1  Ait)
W <= 0] = 1 | I [(Ait+1  Ait) > 0] = 1) (4)
= (1  F)b P(I [(Ait+1  Ait) <= 0] = 1)
where





Pr(I [Aint+1  Aint <= 0] = 1)
and F is the classi￿cation error parameter.
However, when both reported savings are positive, we use a measurement error distribu-
tion to ￿nd the probability of observing the reported choice conditional on the true value.
A.1.2 Biased Classi￿cation Error in Return Migration
There are two important dierences in the classi￿cation error speci￿cation for return mi-
gration. First, a classi￿cation error is possible only when the reported choice is to leave
because the fact that a migrant was interviewed does not leave any doubt that he was in
fact in Germany. This also implies that a classi￿cation error can exist only in the last pe-
riod in the sample. Second, the fact that there may be a classi￿cation error only if the
observed choice is to leave implies that we have a biased classi￿cation error. In this case,
P(mW
T = 1) 6= P(mT = 1).














T = 0|mT = 1) = 0
where G is the parameter indicating the degree of misreporting.
52A.2 Measurement Errors
The measurement error distributions of earnings and savings are independent and serially
uncorrelated. They are speci￿ed in the following way.












A.2.2 Measurement Error in Savings
(At+1  At)








A.3 Calculation of the Probabilities of Reported Spells Condi-
tional on the Simulated Spells
A.3.1 Calculation of P(Mobs
i |Msim
in )
That a classi￿cation error in the reported return outcomes can exist only in the last period in
the sample implies that all simulated spells in which a return takes place before the reported
return in the sample will have zero probabilities. In other words, for a simulated spell to
have positive probability the simulated spell must exactly match the reported choice for all
periods but the last one. Obviously, for this to happen, the outcome must be to stay.
If the simulated spell matches the reported spell at all periods but the last one and in the
last period the reported choice is to return but the choice in the simulation is to stay, the
simulated spell would still have a positive probability due to the existence of classi￿cation


























53A.3.2 Calculation of P(lobs
i |lsim
in )
Unlike the above case, a classi￿cation error in the reported labor market status can exist at
any period. Therefore, we can write the probability of observing the reported labor market
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A.3.3 Calculation of P((At+1  At)obs
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￿0 ￿1 ￿2 ￿3 ￿4 ￿5 ￿6
0.5340 0.5236a 0.0135a 0.6658a 0.0039a 0.0094 0.0326
(0.0747) (1.2242) (0.0240) (0.8281) (0.0099) (0.0204) (0.0676) _____________________________________________
Psychic Cost Parameters
40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47
1.9939b 2.8756c 1.3675c 0.9243c 1.7881b 1.1850c 1.1029 0.1863
(0.1360) (11.9675) (14.5000) (11.5338) (0.1327) (0.1179) (0.6224) (0.0684) _____________________________________________
Bequest Function Parameters
q0 q1 q2 q3
0.3709 9.3895b 0.0897d 0.6983
(0.1740) (3.2551) (0.0389) (0.2434) _____________________________________________
Value Home Parameters
Z02 Z02 Z02 Z02 Z1 Z2 Z3 Z4
7.6909c 3.8763c 5.7141c 6.1790c 1.4891b 1.6297b 0.3368e 0.0078e
(5.2305) (0.6607) (0.5109) (0.5566) (0.7866) (0.0795) (0.0421) (0.0018)
Z5 Z6 Z7 Z8 Z9
2.4243c 0.0703 5.9128b 0.8519c 0.2258
(2.5454) (0.1081) (0.3684) (0.1236) (0.1652) _____________________________________________
55Type Probability Function
V0 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6
0.9229 0.0011 1.0415 0.6801 1.0903 0.4531 0.0385
(5.4983) (0.1715) (2.7622) (3.3745) (2.9194) (3.1107) (0.3981) _____________________________________________
Initial Assets
k0 k1 k2 k3
8.9528b 5.1890b 5.8044f 9.1501f




















a - Parameter multiplied by 1000.
b - Parameter divided by 1000.
c - Parameter divided by 100.
d - Parameter multiplied by 10,000.
e - Parameter multiplied by 100,000
f - Parameter divided by 10.
g - Parameter divided by 107.
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